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Abstract 
 Judge Frank Easterbrook is known for insisting that legislative intent is a misconception, bordering on 
oxymoron. He has also advanced the idea that legislative bargains should be upheld by courts and that where a 
legislature leaves a “gap,” courts should be non-activis rather than eager gap-fillers. Still, there are many cases 
where legislation leaves ambiguities. I suggest that the cause of an ambiguity has some bearing on the best way for 
a judge to resolve it. Easterbrook decisions, including an Equal Pay Act case, where (unequal) wages were based on 
prior compensation, are used to reveal various strategies for dealing with ambiguous statutes. One conclusion is 
that it is almost inevitable that even a non-acticvist judge will occasionally resort to guess-work about legislative 
intent – and that such intent, while unlikely as a matter of public-choice or aggregation theory, is not quite 
impossible to construe correctly. I conclude with the conjecture that the inclination to attach great significance to 
statutory language may be something that falls out of favor because of the reality of the enactment process. 
 
 
 I. 
Imagine that a law school hired four new assistant professors, two from private practice 
and two from public interest positions. All four had numerous, remunerative, private sector 
offers of employment. The dean was eager to secure the services of all four, but the recruitment 
process was conducted with some budget constraints. The dean offered each a position with 
compensation equal to ten percent more than earned in the candidate’s previous job, and all 
accepted. The two who arrive from private practice are men, and the others are women. The men 
are paid twice as much as the women. Do the women have a winning lawsuit? 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 says  
(d)(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall 
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less 
than the rate at which he pays wages to  employees of the opposite sex in such establishment 
for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 
and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made 
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;  (iii) a system which measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.1  
 The law school’s dean might argue that the wage differential is not founded on the 
“basis of sex,” as specified in the first part of the statute’s sentence, but is instead on the basis of 
prior employment or compensation history. This is essentially the argument that has prevailed in 
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1 29 USC §206(d)(1).   
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the Seventh Circuit, which has several times held that “prior wages are a ‘factor other than 
sex.’”2 It is the position advanced by Judge Easterbrook in Wernsing v. Department of Human 
Services (of Illinois), who points out that section 206(d)(1)(iv) of the Equal Pay Act emphasizes 
the point by exempting any pay “differential based on any other factor other than sex.”3 
Wernsing is the only Easterbrook decision involving statutory interpretation that I have found to 
be disappointing. Frank Easterbrook is probably the best and most thoughtful judge our nation 
has ever produced when it comes to matters of statutory interpretation. He makes nearly all 
(other) cases involving statutory interpretation seem remarkably easy, in part because he has a 
theoretical framework at his disposal, and it is therefore worthwhile to examine the cause of any 
difficulties he encounters. I continue, therefore, to examine Wernsing, and then to set it within 
the larger question of when and how judges ought to interpret statutes. 
 
What if our hypothetical law school paid according to height or years of post-graduate 
study, and this produced a pattern in which the average man earned more than the average 
woman, or even every man more than every woman in that workplace? Some appellate courts 
have held that wages in a former job, and presumably other determinants of wages that might be 
highly correlated with sex, are a “factor other than sex” only if the employer has an acceptable 
business reason for its compensation pattern.4 Years of post-graduate study might in this way be 
found to be a reasonable underpinning for law faculty compensation, while height seems like a 
certain loser. We might wonder whether the employer deployed height in order to discriminate 
on the basis of sex, though it might be hard to see why a profit-seeking employer or student-
seeking law school would do so. Some legislators or judges might require a plaintiff to prove that 
the employer intentionally discriminated. A subtle and careful employer will likely prevail if 
intentional discrimination is an essential element of the case. But height seems so unlikely a 
proxy for future performance or competitive offers, that a plaintiff who cannot find evidence of 
intentional discrimination will likely argue that it is too far-fetched to impute or believe that 
                                                 
2 The cases are cited in Wernsing, supra note 3 at 468. The court there also sketches the views of several other 
circuit courts. 
3 Wernsing v Dept Human Services, 427 F3d 466, 468 (7th Cir 2005). For defendant, the best interpretation of 
that phrase is that exception (iv) intentionally provides a catch-all that includes the other three exceptions, so that 
“any other factor other than sex,” rather than containing a superfluous and ungrammatical first “other,” means 
“Reader: these three exceptions are factors other than sex, and now we add a catch-all in (iv) to include any other 
such factor that is also other than sex.” If so, the phrase would be clearer if it said “any other factor that is also a 
factor other than sex.” A more conventional means of conveying that message would have been to begin with the 
catch-all, and then say “including seniority, merit, and quantity of production.”  
 Wernsing is unconcerned, as I will be, with a disparate impact or other claim arising under another statute. 
We might think of the four exceptions, or employer defenses, in the Equal Pay Act, as imported into Title VII, 
without resolving the question of what can be a “factor other than sex.” See Los Angeles Dept Water & Power v 
Manhart, 435 US 702, 710 n20 (1978) (factor cannot be a ‘factor other than sex’ for Equal Pay Act purposes if it 
would violate Title VII’s disparate treatment standard); County of Washington v Gunther, 452 US 161 (1981). 
4 See, e.g., Aldrich v Randolph Central School Dist 963 F2d 520 (2d Cir 1992), cert. denied, 506 US 965 (1992) 
(three Justices dissenting). At times even the Seventh Circuit has left itself room to tighten the “factor other than 
sex” escape by suggesting that it must be bona fide and that there might be room to ask whether it has a 
discriminatory effect. Dey v Colt Constr. & Dev. Co, 28 F3rd 1446, 1462 (7th Cir 1994) (opinion by Judge Rovner 
with Easterbrook not on the panel). Wernsing does not proceed on these paths.  
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there is any good reason for an employer of law professors to pay in proportion to height. Years 
of post-graduate study present a harder case, and prior wages harder still. An employer might 
have some confidence in its own evaluation of job applicants, but reason that it must pay an 
attractive candidate at least as much as that person earned in his or her previous position. The 
employer might also have faith in markets, which is to say in prevailing prices, and reason that 
new employees cannot be worth more than twice what they have recently earned in the 
marketplace. Just as a retailer might use a convention like fixed markups across products, so too 
an employer might “mark up” the last known wages of new employees.  
In short, a female employee who finds she is paid less than male co-workers hired at the 
same time, and even in response to the very same job description, would expect to prevail under 
the Equal Pay Act if her employer has used height to set compensation, but her confidence would 
decline if the employer based its compensation decisions on years of post-graduate study. Her 
case would seem hopeless, in the Seventh Circuit at least, if wages are based on prior wages. 
Judge Easterbrook insists that the statute does not authorize courts to set their own standards of 
acceptable business practices, for “Congress has not authorized federal judges to serve as 
personnel managers for America’s employers,” but asks instead whether the employer has a 
reason other than sex – not whether it has a “good” reason.5 Other circuits may hint or claim that 
there is some congressional intent as to what is a factor other than sex, but seasoned Easterbrook 
readers know that those are fighting words. For Easterbrook (and, I ought to confess, for me as 
well), Congress makes legal rules through statutes, and in most cases we have no reason to think 
we can discern in them some majoritarian intent. Congress has many Members, and they are 
unlikely to think alike. “Congress is a they, not an it,” as the useful expression goes.6 Legislation 
represents some aggregation of their views and thoughts. Typically, we cannot even identify a 
legislature’s median voter, whose intent we might sometimes be inclined to use in order to 
interpret ambiguous statutes. 
But one need not resort to the fiction of legislative intent in order to see that the statute 
can be read in a manner friendlier to plaintiffs . It is true that it asks whether the employer 
discriminates “on the basis of sex.” But why emphasize this phrase rather than the next, which 
says “by paying [one sex] wages . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to 
employees of the opposite sex” for equal work. If the reader emphasizes this second phrase, the 
statute essentially codifies a strict policy of equal pay within one job type, and perhaps also a 
policy of comparable worth with courts put to the task of assessing workplaces and comparing 
jobs in order to determine whether the sexes were comparably paid. How does an employer 
violate the statute “by discriminating on the basis of sex – and even only sex”? – by paying 
unequal wages, as described in that second phrase. This reader is thus interested only in evidence 
of disparate wages (for the same work). In contrast, Easterbrook reads the sentence with an 
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6 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 
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emphasis on the first phrase. What is forbidden? – discrimination on the basis of sex, as opposed 
to discrimination on the basis of height or prior wages. But Easterbrook’s preferred reading 
eviscerates exceptions (i), (ii), and (iii). If a differential based on anything other than sex is 
permitted, under (iv), then of course one based on seniority, merit, or quantity produced is 
permitted. For these prior exceptions (and the word “or” before (iv)) to have content, the word 
“factor” in (iv) should mean something like a reasonable factor. The statute is simply ambiguous, 
for it admits more than a single interpretation.7 One interpretation has a plain phrase going for it, 
but that same understanding makes the other phrases pointless – and might well render the entire 
statute meaningless. Under Easterbrook’s reading, only an employer who really tried to violate 
the statute, and announced as much, would do so. I am not sure there is good reason to prefer one 
reading of the plain words over the other. Nor is it obvious which interpretation to favor if one is 
willing to think about congressional intent. Easterbrook’s version is imperfect because it is 
unlikely that even one Member of Congress would vote for a statute that barred only those 
employers foolish enough to state that no other “factor” brought about the pay differential. But it 
is an unattractive reading because one would think that some Member would have dramatized 
the novelty and reach of a new comparable worth law if he or she thought that was being 
enacted.  
II. 
Let us then think of Wernsing as presenting an ambiguous statute. I return in due course 
to Judge Easterbrook’s inclination in the case, but turn now to the general problem of ambiguous 
statutes. I will suggest that the source or nature of the ambiguity is important. Ambiguity can be 
intentional or unintentional; it can derive from misunderstandings about language, from simple 
mistakes, from a failure to plan ahead, or from the impossibility of seeing very far ahead. I 
develop some ideas about interpretation and the sources of ambiguity with illustrative cases 
decided by this master of statutory interpretation.  
For some judges, ambiguity is simply the opening bell. With encouragement from many 
academic commentators, they take ambiguous code as an opportunity to make good law as they 
see it, to offset interest group effects, or to protect fragile minorities.8 We can think of this as the 
activist approach; gaps, ambiguities, and delegations of authority are all taken as opportunities to 
make the world a better place. The skeptical, democratic, and non-activist reaction is of course to 
                                                 
7 The confusion seems to arise out of the drafter’s attempt to enact something less than a comparable worth 
policy. That policy would have judges comparing the wages of a nurse to those paid to an engineer. But of course 
Wernsing is about identical jobs, not different jobs. The statute seems written for someone looking to compare 
different wages for different jobs, but it is being applied to a case where there is a wage differential for the same job 
– but perhaps a differential based on something other than sex. 
8 Starting points in this small industry of academic literature on the topic include Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting 
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223 
(1986) (judges should stick to the statutory language, not on a presumed bargain between interest group and 
legislature) and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for 
Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va L Rev 275 (1988) (courts should construe statutes in light of size and power of 
interested groups). 
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worry that judges will make mistakes, usurp the legislative role, or even advance their own 
political agendas. Inasmuch as the focus here is on ambiguous statutes, it is useful to separate 
out, if at all possible, two kinds of cases that involve something more than mere ambiguities. I do 
not advance these categories as natural or as necessary, but rather I borrow them from 
Easterbrook’s own, well-known academic work, in order that we might better understand his 
treatment of ambiguous statutes. There are, first, cases where the legislature has asked judges to 
proceed in the manner of the common law. Easterbrook’s favorite example is the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, which we might think of as stating a standard rather than a rule, and then 
delegating to judges the task of deciding what it means “to monopolize” or to contract in 
“restraint on trade.”9 It may be that such a statute is the product, or compromise, arising out a 
battle of interest groups, but then Easterbrook is committed to enforcing such legislative 
bargains.10 It may also be that such delegations to the judiciary were more common before the 
rise of modern administrative agencies. 
At the other, more interesting end of the interpretation spectrum are cases where the 
legislature has intentionally left a gap, to use the accepted term. In these cases, Judge 
Easterbrook, famously, believes that judges ought to be disinclined to take on the task of gap-
filling. It is presumably impossible to ascertain the legislature’s intent with respect to this 
unfilled space, and attempts by judges to fill gaps will often reflect a given judge’s own values 
and politics. The matter ought to be resolved by the legislature, or ought to be regarded as 
already resolved by the language of the statute, even if a reasonable person would think that 
Members of the enacting Congress did not anticipate the case at hand. Easterbrook allows that, 
where there are gaps, there may be some role for judges not only because they can insist on 
sticking to the statutory language,11 but also because the litigants are free to look outside the 
statute’s domain to other tools of law that might apply to their dispute.12 I have some difficulty 
                                                 
9 Easterbrook himself offers the Sherman Antitrust Act as the classic example of such delegation. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 544 (1983). Wernsing bears no signs of being such a case. 
10 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61 
(1994) (enforcing interest-group bargains in the form of statutes may in the long run lead to legislative 
accountability). In any event, Easterbrook does not shy away from common law judging, even if it arises from 
apparent statutory delegations, though it should be noted that common law judging may itself bring out different 
degrees of activism, or of commitment to precedents, across the judiciary. 
11 See, e.g., United States v Mitra, 405 F3rd 492, 495 (7th Cir 2005)(applying statute written to criminalize 
hacking into a “protected computer” to defendant who interfered with a radio system, Easterbrook noting “As more 
devices come to have built-in intelligence, the effective scope of the statute grows. This might prompt Congress to 
amend the statute but does not authorize the judiciary to give the existing version less coverage than its language 
portends.”) 
12 Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 544 (“unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a 
form of common law, the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly 
resolved in the legislative process. . . [In other cases t]he statute would become irrelevant, the parties (and the court) 
remitted to whatever other sources of law might be applicable.”). Easterbrook goes on to advance several arguments 
against judges’ filling “gaps” left by the legislature. Id at 548-49. 
 At the risk of misrepresenting Easterbrook’s views, it may be useful to imagine particular gaps and how 
they might be filled or avoided. Consider legislation that said that a defendant should be interrogated more harshly 
when suspected of terrorism. Here, there is a sizeable gap because “more harshly” is terribly vague and leaves much 
6 
distinguishing gaps from ambiguities, but that difficulty should not be the centerpiece here.13 It is 
sufficient to say that Wernsing’s ambiguity is surely something smaller than (what is meant by) a 
gap, and thus something that a judge, or other useful agent, must resolve. With these two subsets 
– common law delegations and “gaps” – removed, one because even a non-activist judge will 
proceed with relish and the other creating space where he dare not tread, we are prepared for 
ambiguous statutes. 
III. 
In Continental Can v. Chicago Truck Drivers, the governing statute afforded Continental 
Can, when it closed a trucking business, a means of escaping the obligation to pay a share of an 
underfunded pension plan if “substantially all” of the pension fund’s assets derived from 
“employers primarily engaged in the long and short haul trucking industry.”14 In fact, about 62% 
                                                                                                                                                             
room for post-legislative lawmaking. The task would be easier if “more harshly” had a well accepted meaning in 
penal statutes. It is hard to imagine judges’ filling this gap without resorting to their own sentiments, and that is not 
something a non-activist, or even moderately activist judge, would wish to do. We might expect the non-activist 
strategy to cause cases arising under this hypothetical statute to be remanded or swept away with the claim that the 
legislative language was hortatory, in the manner of a resolution, and not capable of execution. Imagine next a 
statute declaring “inasmuch as safety is of paramount importance, there is hereby imposed a civil fine of $100, 
multiplied by the number of manufactured and shipped units of that kind and awarded to a private citizen who is 
injured and brings an unsafe ladder to the attention of the Safety Commission; an unsafe ladder includes, but is not 
limited to, one that fails to hold a 600 pound weight.” The statute has some specific instructions, but it leaves open 
the question of those other safety features. A plaintiff might insist that the rungs on a ladder were spaced too far 
apart. Easterbrook would try hard not to fill the gap himself – and this seems more of a gap than an ambiguity. He 
might remand or resort to the default rule provided by common law negligence jurisprudence, but he would insist 
that the express language about the importance of safety helps not a bit with “intent” because the statute also reflects 
an awareness of costs, and the question is how to balance safety with costs – and that is not something provided 
except with respect to carrying capacity. It is also possible that he would refuse to fill the gap, but in that case a 
plaintiff would be left with other law, including the common law, and would presumably try to show negligent 
design as a means of collecting the fines. 
13 The difficulty derives in part from the fact that some ambiguities are intentional. A legislature can see that 
technology will change or that some of the expressions it uses are capable of multiple translations, and so when 
there is anticipated or intentional ambiguity there is in a sense a gap for courts to fill. But it also derives from the 
fact that it is not just broad standards but even everyday rules that beget gaps. A standard is necessarily a delegation 
to courts or agencies to interpret, but so is a rule because even clear rules have standard-like features, unless they 
come with many pages of associated sub-rules. A speed limit is not a license to drive through a pedestrian who has 
wandered on to the road, and it does not allow weaving or driving in reverse at the stated speed. The tradeoff 
between, or reality of, standards and rules is the stuff of every principal-agent relationship. When Congress uses 
confusing grammar, or an expression like “substantially all,” or when it provides that a bank can sell insurance if it 
is located in a small town – but does not specify to whom the insurance might be sold, NBD Bank v Bennett, 67 F3d 
629 (7th Cir 1995) (bank allowed to sell insurance with Judge Easterbrook declining to look beyond plain statutory 
language), it is essentially asking some agent, often unidentified, to do the work. Ambiguities or uncertainties about 
statutes may not be very different from legislated standards or from virtually explicit delegations; all require 
interpretation by agents. Easterbrook is not alone in thinking that self-delegation – to a Congressional committee or 
to the remarks of one or two Members – is not something to be imputed lightly. John Manning, Textualism As a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L Rev 673 (1997) (discussing the textualist critique of the use of legislative 
history). But of course the irony is that we are left with judges (and sometimes with administrative agencies) as the 
interpreting agents. 
14 Continental Can Company v Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) 
Pension Fund, 916 F2d 1154, 1155 (7th Cir 1990). 
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of the relevant fund’s assets were attributable to such employers, and so Continental Can would 
win only if “substantially all” meant something less than that. The company argued that the 
statutory phrase referred to a simple majority of the assets, but Easterbrook, citing the Member 
of Congress who was the bill’s floor manager, noted that the phrase appeared in a number of tax 
laws, where the Internal Revenue Service had always interpreted the phrase to mean at least 
85%. Here Judge Easterbrook concedes ambiguity, but claims no gap, and adds the nice 
explanation that the ambiguity may be traced to the proclivity of Members of Congress for 
saying different things to different interest groups.15 But what is a judge to do with such raw 
ambiguity? The judge might like to return the statute to its sender, but we do not sanction such a 
remedy. Moreover, it is not the sitting, contemporary Congress that matters, but the enacting one, 
and that body is no longer available. Plainly, a faithful agent must undertake the task. 
It is one thing to say that “Congress is a they, not an it,” because a group that acts is 
unlikely to have a single intention (for normally a group of voters have disparate motivations), 
but quite another to say that words agreed upon by a group have no meanings. Language is little 
more than shared meanings, and it is surely legitimate to assign meanings to statutes based on the 
shared understandings of those who enacted the statute, or perhaps those whom the statute was 
“intended” to govern. We might even refer to those understandings as intentions. If 
“substantially all” were always interpreted to mean 85%, and the early interpretations the product 
of explicit delegation to an agency, say, and Members of Congress knew that the phrase had 
acquired that meaning, then the case would be easy. If, as happened with the statute at issue in 
Continental Can, one Senator tried to advance a different meaning, that 50.1% amounts to 
substantially all, the situation would be ripe for a lesson on intent and ambiguity. Judge 
Easterbrook is not shy about teaching it: “The text of the statute, and not the private intent of the 
legislators, is the law. . . It is easy to announce intents and hard to enact laws. . . So the text is 
law and legislative intent a clue to the meaning of the text, rather than the text being a clue to 
legislative intent. . . If everyone accepts a new meaning for a word, then the language has 
changed [and every instance cited pegs ‘substantially all’ at 85% or more]; if one speaker 
chooses a private meaning [of 50.1%], we have babble rather than communication.”16 
Imagine, however, that “substantially all” does not in fact always mean 85% in the world 
of pensions, taxes, or in other federal regulations, but rather that sometimes the Internal Revenue 
Service, other agencies, and the courts attach 90% or 70% or even 50% meanings to that 
phrase.17 I think that a modest or non-activist judge would then say that in the quest to attach 
                                                 
15 916 F2d at 1156. 
16 The Judge goes on to make short shrift of an argument that the statute must have bite, and that an 85% 
interpretation happens to yield very little of that because most firms in the industry do not meet the 85% standard. 
The argument is that Congress legislated a plan not an outcome. If it is disappointed with the results it may change 
the law. 
17 As it turns out this is the case. Even in the narrow area of corporate acquisitions, where tax free 
reorganization status may depend on the acquisition of “substantially all of the properties of another corporation,” 
under IRC 368(a)(1)(C), there is some disagreement as to the meaning of the term, though 90% and 70% are 
important focal points. See Robert H. Wellen, More Problems Complicate the Application of ‘Subsatntially All’ to 
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meaning to statutory language, we are better off choosing the understanding usually associated 
with that language at the time the statute was enacted than having judges decide based on what 
they think best, what they think most Members of Congress (or Members in the majority) 
intended, or what they read in prior or subsequent legislative histories inserted by individual 
Members of Congress.  
There is something of a logical problem with statutes that convey ambiguities rather than 
plain meanings. Judge Easterbrook (and academic commentators) may be right about the way to 
think about claims of legislative intent, but what if most other judges do not see it that way, and 
then (a large majority of ) Members of Congress also attach a meaning to their own ambiguous 
statutes or to the concept of their own intent? If “substantially all” had five different meanings, 
and these meanings were originally created by authorized interpreters, after which Congress 
continued to enact statutes with the very same phrase, we might be forced to say that the 
accepted meaning of that language was the same as language that said “the meaning of 
‘substantially all’ in this statute shall be determined by regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of the Treasury or by the common law process.” Similarly, if Wernsing is hopelessly ambiguous, 
depending on whether one emphasizes the first or second phrase of the key sentence of the cited 
provision of the Equal Pay Act, then a reasonable case can be made that our most able judges 
could regard themselves as thrust into the position of lawmakers, rather than interpreters, 
because the language enacted by Congress virtually commands that some agent act as interpreter. 
In thinking about the role courts might play with respect to these ambiguities, avoidable 
or not, we might ask whether the source of the ambiguity matters. Why do legislatures not clarify 
and specify as much as possible, especially where the “intent” seems to be to enact a rule rather 
than a standard? In public choice terms, a legislature that sought to get maximum credit or other 
benefit for its work, would want to provide more specificity rather than more delegation of 
authority. Can interest groups really be often fooled by inconsistent claims? Let us again set 
aside the important case where a legislature resorts to the common law process because that 
delegation to the judiciary is itself the legislative decision, or interest-group compromise. But 
why, for example, would a legislature say that a benefit is available to some firm if “substantially 
all” its workers do something, when Members must know that the expression is ambiguous?  
We have already seen that ambiguity might allow legislators to make different claims to 
different constituents or supporters – but we are left with the question of what courts ought to do 
with such intentionally ambiguous statutes. A might tell group X one thing and group Y another, 
or perhaps A might tell XY one thing, while B might tell V another, even though A and B both 
voted for the legislation in question. I would think that constituents would learn to despise and 
distrust ambiguity, but perhaps this strategy is especially valuable if the statute is passed before 
                                                                                                                                                             
Acquisitions, 79 J Taxation (1993). If we are free to look beyond tax law, it is especially easy to see that 
“substantially all” may even mean 50%. See Antilles Cement v Anibal Acevedo Vila, 408 F3d 41 (1st Cir 2005) 
(law requiring “substantially all” U.S.-made inputs defined by federal regulations to mean 50%).  
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an election, and the ambiguities are not tallied until later. A says that substantially all means 
50%, and this makes Continental Can happy (assuming a firm is an it, not a they, for this 
purpose), while B, or even A and B, claim to other constituents that they have taken steps to 
ensure that pension funds will not be underfunded. An idealist might say that if this is the reason 
for ambiguity, then courts should not facilitate the charade. I suppose courts could try to draw 
attention to the ambiguity in order to embarrass the enacting legislators. In any event, under this 
view, there is no correct interpretation, and courts might as well flip coins, unless the democracy-
friendly plan is for legislatures to please their friends in the short run, and then blame courts later 
for “misinterpretations.” If so, one possibility is for judges to act as they are acculturated to do in 
common law matters, trying simply to improve the world (with an eye on precedent, perhaps as a 
means of controlling activism) rather than divine legislative intent. The rare judge who was 
determined to be minimally activist, and only when necessary, might follow other circuits more 
than usual or might remand, all in the interest of not projecting one’s own preferences. The 
activist would plainly jump into action in Wernsing, taking it as an opportunity to decide whether 
comparable worth is good policy. In Continental Can it is more difficult to be an energetic agent, 
and certainly a moderately activist one, because the case is about complicated legislative deals in 
which some interest groups are subsidized at the expense of others. It is hard to see how a court 
(or other agent) could be expected to do this, unless the default is that lower subsidies are always 
better than higher or more subsidies.  
Ambiguity might also arise because of changing times. Statutes need to be updated, and 
legislators are surely far-sighted enough to know that. In one bankruptcy case, Erickson,18 a 
Wisconsin statute, last visited by the legislature in 1935, allowed the debtor to exempt some 
property from civil judgments. The list of such property included eight cows, one mower, one 
hay seeder, one year’s feed for the livestock, and fifteen or so other types of property, some with 
capped values. The debtor in the 1980s had a baler and a haybine that were, essentially, much 
improved, multi-purpose versions of their single-function predecessors on the statute’s outdated 
list. Judge Easterbrook reasoned sensibly that just as a “chair” in an old statute would now 
include an easy chair but not a Chippendale chair, too valuable to sit on, so too one must look at 
the function of the items in the original Wisconsin statute.19  
In Erickson, unlike Continental Can, the ambiguity is unintentional, unless we think the 
enacting legislature must have known that “its” list would eventually be outdated, so that the 
very creation of such a list intentionally delegates, or leaves real gaps,20 But assuming that the 
built-in obsolescence is best characterized as unintentional and as a source of ambiguity, rather 
than yawning gaps, it is still the case that the legislature’s list almost necessarily creates work for 
an agent. The agent can be extremely activist, declaring the statute obsolete and making the best 
                                                 
18 In the Matter of Erickson, 815 F2d 1090 (7th Cir 1987). 
19 815 F2d at 1092 (“The role of an exemption in the statutory structure . . . is the centerpiece in identifying the 
meaning of the language.”). 
20 I follow the Easterbrook framework here. See supra note 12. 
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law for the presumed subject matter; moderately activist, beginning with the purpose of 
exemptions or the purpose of the statute as a whole; or minimally activist, assessing the purpose 
of the particular exemptions noted in the language of the statute. Note that each of these 
approaches necessarily calls for some inquiry into legislative purpose, or statutory “function,” 
unless the agent is to value principle (and foolishness) over common sense. The legislature is still 
a “they, not an it” when it comes to this purpose, and yet the agent is in the position of discerning 
a single purpose. The point, again, is that legislative intent may be a fiction to be avoided, but if 
one is to be a useful agent in the legal system, one is virtually compelled to join in the fiction 
from time to time. 
This is perhaps the point at which to emphasize that if a group is of several minds, no 
method of aggregation can be guaranteed to fulfill some basic requirements, where one of these 
is coherence, or transitivity. But it is important to see that if we are lucky, and perhaps just when 
it is necessary for an agent to update an old list, or otherwise resolve an ambiguity, the intentions 
of most members of the enacting legislature might actually be discernible, of a piece, or at least 
capable of coherent aggregation.21 There are no guarantees. It is possible that some of the 
Wisconsin legislators in 1935 thought they were helping small farms to survive, while others 
thought they were helping the manufacturers of mowers, and still others intended to help rural 
interests over banks (though the latter could just raise interest rates in response to the 
exemptions).22 If so, one might hesitate before updating the list because there is no single 
legislative purpose, and it is quite plausible that a majority of the enacting legislature would have 
opposed the interpretation constructed by the activist judge. But inasmuch as it is impossible to 
abide by the plain meaning attached to “mower” fifty years earlier, the modern judge must do 
something. Unsurprisingly, Easterbrook tries to be minimally activist, and he looks to the 
function of “mower” rather than the function of the statute as a whole; he certainly has no 
interest in declaring the statute altogether outdated in order to redesign a list from scratch – or 
even revisit the question of whether exemptions are wise. In short, updating begets some inquiry 
into function, or intent, despite the dangers of imagining that there is such a thing as legislative 
agreement on anything but the words as enacted. The strategy is, however, a bit different from 
that found in cases where ambiguity is a strategy meant to elide over matters the resolution of 
which might dissatisfy particular constituents.  
There are obviously many other causes of ambiguous statutes. One of Judge 
Easterbrook’s most important contributions in a distinguished judicial career has been to focus 
                                                 
21 I am not associating myself with the belief or wish that cycling is rare so that aggregating legislators’ 
intentions is something we can normally do. Compare Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and 
Public Choice, 74 Va L Rev 423 (1988) with Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U Chi L Rev 777, 789-93 
(2005) (cycling can be common and is often unseen because it is pushed back in the legislative process). 
22 I suspect that most readers will think that the first purpose is what a supermajority of legislators had in their 
minds. In that case, it seems especially safe to proceed as Easterbrook did. But the lesson of the case is then that 
while it can be dangerous to impute a single, aggregated legislative intent, it is sometimes less dangerous, or even 
reasonable, to do so. In any event, if in Erickson the intent is safely discerned, then it is a very different case from 
Wernsing, where the best guess is probably that the ambiguity was intentional as discussed in the text. 
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attention on the danger (though I have already insisted that it is not quite the impossibility) of 
claiming to discern legislative intent. If his job is to convince not only the choir but also some 
other judges, then I think his best chance for success is where “intent” is said to inform a broad 
statutory goal. Thus, in Contract Courier the U.S. Department of Transportation argued that the 
ambiguous word “knowingly” should be interpreted to include “should have known” so that a 
statute would impose strict liability on a party that had improperly placed cartons containing 
radioactive material. 23 The Department argued that the law in question was a remedial statute, 
and therefore ought to be construed liberally. Judge Easterbrook found the maxim “useless not 
only because it invites the equal and opposite riposte that penal statutes are to be strictly 
construed but also because it does not answer the question ‘how far?’. Statutes do more than 
point in a direction, such as ‘more safety.’ They achieve a particular amount of that objective, at 
a particular cost in other interests.”24 In this regard, Easterbrook has been influential, as many 
decisions now find that legislative intent (which they might assume exists) is not furthered by 
assuming that whatever advances the statute’s primary objective must be the “intent” or content 
of a law.25 Even if a court thinks that it can discern the aggregated intent or purpose of a great 
majority of legislators, their agreed-upon strategy might simply be to balance a goal with the 
costs of advancing toward that goal.26 And even if the group agrees on the precise balance, it 
does not help courts in interpreting some ambiguity in the enacted statute to know that the 
purpose was to balance. If, as seems more likely, the legislators do not entirely agree on the 
precise balancing of advancing toward a goal and controlling costs (including the negative 
effects on other desired outcomes), then we might wish we could identify the median voter in the 
legislative body, and then discern that legislator’s own calculation of costs and benefits. Of 
course, none of this can be done well; committee reports do not help identify or unpeel this 
median legislator.  
                                                 
23 Contract Courier Services v Research & Special Programs Admin., 924 F2d 112 (7th Cir 1991). 
24 924 F2d at 115. 
25 The flag was raised at the highest level in Rodriguez v United States, 480 US 522, 526 (1987), and I do not 
mean to imply that Easterbrook gets all the credit. But his academic writing and constant advancement of this cause 
in his decisions have influenced a new generation of clerks, lawyers, and even judges. Easterbrook politely cites 
Rodriguez, but we might better cite Statutes’ Domains, supra note 9, at 533: 
Almost all statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of many a compromise is the 
decision, usually unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved. . . What matters to the 
compromisers is reducing the chance that their work will be invoked subsequently to achieve 
more, or less, than they intended, thereby upsetting the balance of the package. 
This concern for balance is not confined to interest group (pie-slicing) legislation . . .[b]alance 
is as important in public interest (pie-enlarging) legislation, for the structure of the statute will 
determine how the public interest is to be achieved. . . Legislators seeking only to further the 
public interest may conclude that the provision of public rules should reach so far and no farther, 
whether because of deliberate compromise, because of respect for private orderings, or because of 
uncertainty coupled with concern that to regulate in the face of the unknown is to risk loss for little 
gain. No matter how good the end in view, achievement of the end will have some cost, and at 
some point the cost will begin to exceed the benefits. Id at 540-41.  
26 As discussed in the hypothetical example offered in note 12. 
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There remains the question of judging such cases, where a faithful resolution of 
ambiguity requires knowledge of how goals and costs were balanced – and where a judge cannot 
possibly know the intended balance. My sense is that in these cases, the least active branch, or 
perhaps it is just Judge Easterbrook, does his best to avoid activism. The judge remands, the 
judge look to state courts, declare ties, and does whatever it takes to wish away the task of 
resolving ambiguity and imposing one’s own preferences.27 It is hard not to respect the modesty 
inherent in this approach. At the same time, when a decision is in the hands of Frank 
Easterbrook, it is easy to get carried away and to imagine that he must be representative of a 
large cadre of extraordinarily able judges. With such agents on our payroll, it is natural to wish 
that they allowed themselves to be lawmakers-in-waiting when the constitutionally authorized 
lawmakers have generated ambiguous products.  
IV. 
I return to Wernsing, where Judge Easterbrook found clarity but where others would 
likely see ambiguity or a different conclusion. I have suggested that if the ambiguity be willful, 
then a starting point might be to ascertain the reason for the particular ambiguity. In some cases 
it would be useful to know the legislative intent, if by any chance there was a coherent, 
majoritarian mindset. It is perhaps good news that even our most careful judge does on occasion, 
as in Erickson, imagine that a single legislative intent was behind a statute. It is impossible to 
guarantee a coherent aggregation of the preferences of many people, but it is not impossible that 
such an aggregation does exist in a particular case. Even so, there is the argument that judges, 
who will have the opportunity to project their own preferences, should not be in the position of 
deciding whether the intent of a collective is discernible. Judicial activism also runs the danger 
that attempts to aggregate will go awry, with the observer misconstruing the real majoritarian 
intent, even if it exists. In this regard, the problem of ambiguous statutes is very much like the 
problem of interpreting judicial pluralities, where the agent might well misconstrue the reasoning 
of the “enacting” majority.28 At best, then, our judges might be good at identifying these 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Covalt v Carey Canada Inc, 860 F2d 1434 (7th Cir 1988) (certifying a question of Indiana law to the 
Supreme Court of Indiana); Erickson, supra note 18 at 1094-1094, ("To the extent there is doubt – and there is still 
substantial doubt, for the age of this statute prevents 'literal' application to today's farm equipment...we accept the 
decision of the bankruptcy and district judges. The views here of judges skilled in the law of the state in which they 
sit are entitled to respect. . . The law has need of tie-breakers, and if this case be a tie (it comes close), the nod goes 
to the district court's construction. This statute needs legislative attention; we cannot provide more than emergency 
care, and it is wise to avoid switching treatments so quickly."); Contract Courier Services, supra note 23 (remanding 
to the district court for it to remand to the Department of Transportation so that the Department could address the 
question of whether the persons who placed the radioactive cartons were Contract Courier's employees). 
28 See Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 87, 94-106 
(2002). In a manner analogous to the analysis undertaken here, we find that some courts, in some eras, refused to 
construe the supposed majority reasoning behind split opinions (much like Easterbrook prefers not to fill gaps left by 
the legislature), but that the more popular current practice is to abide by a rule of finding precedent (by looking for 
the narrowest ground common to the plurality and concurring opinions). A modest danger is that there is no majority 
reasoning to be found (a result that is close to the claim advanced by Easterbrook when he says that a group is a 
they, not an it) and a greater danger is that a later court will positively misconstrue the real majority view. Id at 101-
06.  
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instances where Congress is a they, to be sure, but where “it” is reasonably single-peaked, or 
single-minded. Activists might also claim that whenever ambiguities are intentional, the enacting 
legislature has delegated, so that there is no danger of misconstruing legislative intent. 
In any event, the ambiguity in Wernsing does not derive either from uncertain language 
(as in “substantially all”) or from obsolescence (as in Erickson’s old list of exemptions). The 
source of the ambiguity is most likely one of simple mistake. Perhaps in the rush to a drafting 
deadline, two phrases were inserted, and we have no way of knowing what a group of legislators 
would have done had the inconsistency between the phrases been brought to light. With some 
other judge, it might be tempting to say that this mistake, and the resulting ambiguity, triggered 
judicial activism in a politically charged case. The judge writing the case might have avoided 
waving the activist flag by insisting that the language was unambiguous. I suspect that such a 
judge, if faced with the hypothetical case offered at the start of this Essay, would allow plaintiff 
to prevail, and might in that instance say that the second phrase, or perhaps the listing of several 
exceptions, made the statute unambiguous. 
But we know that when Judge Easterbrook confronts statutory ambiguity, he remains as 
non-activist as possible. In Wernsing, there was no state court, expert, or agency to which to turn. 
The non-activist thing to do was to affirm what the lower court had done, and so he did. I like to 
think that if Judge Easterbrook had seen the statute as internally conflicted, and sufficiently so to 
regard it as an instance of legislative delegation in the manner of the common law, we would 
have been treated to a fuller discussion of the dangers of comparable worth policy. But one cost 
of judicial modesty is that we are unable to enjoy such discussions.  
Judge Easterbrook’s approach is plainly coherent, even if it requires occasional guess 
work regarding legislative minds. It may well be the best approach to ambiguous statutes, and it 
is certainly the one most thought through and most cognizant of the aggregation problem. Still, it 
is tempting to wonder what will become of it, which is to say Judge Easterbrook’s legacy. If 
many more judges had followed suit, the approach would have much more to recommend it 
because there might then be the feedback effect on Congress that the approach contemplates. But 
even after twenty-five years of Judge Easterbrook, we have no reason to think that Members of 
Congress draft more carefully or resolve more disputes among themselves because there are 
judges on the bench who will hold them to their bargains and language. I think it more likely that 
in the distant future the Easterbrook approach will seem precious. Some of us like to insist on 
statutes as written because the approach avoids the problem of misconstruing legislative minds. 
But to most people, repeated evidence that statutes running many hundreds of pages are never 
read or understood by those who voted for them might make the approach seem pedantic. Why 
indeed do we pay so much attention to statutory language when our elected officials do no such 
thing? For one generation, it is because unbridled judicial activism is even worse. But this 
answer might not satisfy the next generation of lawyers and citizens. And one place to begin 
rethinking the dynamic process among voters, legislators, agencies, and judges is with 
ambiguous statutes.  
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